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GUEST STATUTE: EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY-Sidle v. Majors, 536 F.2d 1156, cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 366
(1976).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Automobile guest statutes, which deny recovery to a nonpaying automobile passenger injured as a result of his host driver's
ordinary negligence, have existed at one time or another in twentyeight states.' All guest statutes were enacted between 1927 and
1939,1 and since their inception have been subject to some praise3
and much criticism.' Since the Supreme Court of California struck
down that state's guest statute in Brown v. Merlo,5 numerous other
states have had to decide the fate of their guest statutes as a result
of constitutional challenges based on the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.' Sidle v. Majors7 presented for the first
time to a United States Court of Appeals an equal protection challenge to a state guest statute.8
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In December 1973, Sidle, a resident of North Carolina, brought
a diversity action against Majors, a resident of Indiana, alleging
that Majors' negligence in failing to keep his automobile on the road
resulted in an accident causing Sidle severe injuries. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana entered
1. Tipton, Florida'sAutomobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 287, 288 (1958).
2. Id. at 287-88.
3. See Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. CIN. L. REV. 24 (1937); Comment, 18 CALIF. L. REV.
184 (1930).
4. See Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases-Lots of Them (The California Guest
Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1 (1968); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 382-85 (4th ed. 1971).
5. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
6. Sidle v. Majors, 341 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 1976); Botsch v. Reisdorff, 193 Neb. 165, 226
N.W.2d 121 (1975); Behrns v. Burke, 229 N.W.2d 86 (S.D. 1975); White v. Hughes, 257 Ark.
627, 519 S.W.2d 70 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805 (1975); Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio
St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975); Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowen, 394 Mich. 655,
232 N.W.2d 636 (1975); McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975); Laakonen v.
Eighth Judicial District, 538 P.2d 574 (Nev. 1975); Beasley v. Bozeman, 294 Ala. 288, 315
So. 2d 570 (1975); Thompson v. Hagen, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder,
213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974); Cannon
v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (Utah), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 810, rehearing denied, 419 U.S.
1060 (1974); Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. 1974); Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d
687 (Iowa 1974); Duerst v. Limbocker, 525 P.2d 99 (Ore. 1974); Richardson v. Hansen, 527
P.2d 536 (Colo. 1974) (Colorado guest statute subsequently repealed); Tisko v. Harrison, 500
S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
7. 536 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1976).
8. Id. at 1160.
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summary judgment 9 for Majors based on the 1929 Indiana Guest
Statute,10 which provides that the operator of a motor vehicle shall
not be liable to a guest for injuries resulting from the operator's
negligent operation of the vehicle.
In both the district court and on appeal to the Seventh Circuit,
Sidle challenged the constitutionality of the Indiana guest statute
under Article I §§ 12 and 23" of the Indiana Constitution and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment' 2 to the Constitution. The question of the constitutionality of the guest statute
under the Indiana Constitution was certified' 3 to the Indiana Supreme Court which held that the statute did not contravene the
Indiana Constitution.' 4 In affirming the decision of the district
court, the Seventh Circuit relied extensively on the, substantial rationality approach to equal protection analysis espoused by the
Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed'5 as opposed to the minimum ra9. Id. at 1156-57.
10. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-3-3-1 (Bums) provides:
The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall
not be liable for loss or damages arising from injuries to or death of a guest, while being
transported without payment therefore, in or upon such motor vehicle, resulting from
the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the wanton or willful
misconduct of such operator, owner or person responsible for the operation of such
motor vehicle.
11. IND. CONST. art. I, § 12 provides:
All courts shall be open; and every man, for injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered
freely and without purchase; completely and without denial, speedily and without
delay.
IND. CONST. art. I, § 23 provides:
Privileges Equal. The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of
citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong
to all citizens.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
13. This procedure is illustrative of the abstention doctrine. When questions of state
law may be dispositive of a case, a federal court can retain jurisdiction until the parties have
had an opportunity to obtain from the state court a decision on the state issues involved.
Thus, the state court decides the state issues and the federal court avoids deciding a federal
constitutional question prematurely or unnecessarily, since if the state court should hold the
matter unauthorized as a matter of state law, there will be no need for the federal court to
pass on the federal question. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 218-19 (3d ed. 1976).
14. 341 N.E.2d 763 (Ind.1976).
15. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 235 U.S. 412, 413
(1920).
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tionality approach espoused by the Court in Dandridge v.
Williams." It is the conflict between the substantial and minimum
rationality standards upon which the question of the constitutionality of the guest statute centers.
III.

THE CURRENT SUPREME COURT APPROACH TO EQUAL PROTECTION

ANALYSIS "

By the late 1960's the United States Supreme Court had developed a sharply differentiated two-tier approach to equal protection
analysis." The first tier of the two-tier analysis is composed of fundamental interests and suspect classifications. The fundamental
interest portion of the analysis involves rights found in the constitution and rights which rest on fundamental human activities or
interests, including: the fundamental interest in voting and access
to the ballot; 8 the fundamental interest in access to the judicial
process;" and the fundamental right to travel.2 0 Classifications
based on race, lineage and alienage are considered suspect. 2 If the
interest infringed is fundamental or if the statutory classification is
suspect the Court applies a strict scrutiny test requiring the state
to show a compelling 22 interest which justifies the infringement or
classification. Legislation which qualified for strict scrutiny requires
a far closer link between the classification and the statutory purpose; that is, a far closer congruence between the means and ends
of the legislation. A very heavy burden of justification is placed
upon the state rather than the party challenging the classification
or alleged infringement. Rarely have courts sustained legislation
2
subject to this standard of review.
The second tier of the equal protection model is composed of
the traditional equal protection test. The traditional equal protec16. 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
17. The "old" variety of equal protection analysis focused solely on the means used by
the legislature. Equal protection analysis was not typically concerned with second-guessing
and restraining legislative ends. Only in limited contexts-most notably racial discrimination
cases-did the Court closely scrutinize statutory classifications. See Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949) and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
18. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) and Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968).
19. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
20. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
21. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1124
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection].
22. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
23. See Equal Protection,supra note 21, at 1101 (1969). See also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
24. See Equal Protection, supra note 21, at 1101 (1969).
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tion test deals principally with social and economic legislation, 5 and
requires only that there be some rational connection between the
legislative classification and objective." The traditional test requires a minimal link between the classifying means and the legislative end. The test is extremely deferential, leaving considerable
flexibility to the legislature. 7 Under the traditional test, it has been
said that "a statutory classification will not be set aside if any state
of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."2s A classification
will stand unless it is shown to be essentially arbitrary.29 Rarely has
a statute been found so wanting in rationality as to fail to satisfy
this minimum rationality test.30
The United States Supreme Court has recently found a number
of social and economic statutes unconstitutional by applying a
stricter form of the traditional equal protection test.3 Under this
approach, the Court has seriously applied a basic constitutional
requirement: that legislative means must substantially further legislative ends. 32 Further, legislative means must have a substantial
basis in actuality, not merely conjecture. This new approach to the
traditional test, while narrowing the gap between the first and second tier of the equal protection model, would require judges to gauge
the reasonableness of the means on the basis of the material offered33
to the court, rather than by resorting to judicial rationalization.
The level of scrutiny required by the traditional test has been raised
from virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry.3 4 The limitations of this new approach stem from the limitations of judicial
from summarily categorizing legislation as social
competence, 3 not
5
or economic.
The use of this bifurcated approach to the traditional equal
protection test has produced conflicting results in states whose guest
25. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
26. Id. at 109.
27. See, e.g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
28. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 485, quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 426 (1961).
29. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 464 (1957), quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
30. From 1941 to 1970, the United States Supreme Court found economic legislation
violative of the equal protection clause in only one case, Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
31. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
32. Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 20 (1972).
33. Id. at 21.
34. Id. at 24.
35. Id.at 23.
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statutes have been challenged on equal protection grounds. Employing the substantial rationality test, the supreme courts of eight
states have found their guest statutes unconstitutional," while
eleven states, employing the minimum rationality test, have found
their statutes constitutional." Those states which have upheld their
statutes have relied on the minimum rationality approach to equal
protection analysis best exemplified by Dandridge v. Williams."
The Dandridge approach literally precludes analysis of the statutory classification and will not support a finding of unconstitutionality so long as there is "any conceivable state of facts" to
support the classification. 9 Those states which have overturned
their statutes have relied on the substantial rationality approach
to the traditional test enunciated in Reed v. Reed." The Reed
approach invites the court to examine and determine whether the
classification bears a real relation to the perceived purposes of the
statute. The means of the legislation must have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.' Both standards
express the rule that the classification must be reasonable, but they
differ in defining the criteria for reasonableness.
Two basic reasons for the passage of guest statutes were the
protection of the hospitable driver from suits by ungrateful guests"
and the prevention of collusive lawsuits . 3 With regard to the hospitality rationale, the economic conditions of the 30's gave rise to the
fear that the large number of hitchhikers on America's highways
would take advantage of generous but unsuspecting motorists." The
notion of the collusive lawsuit also arose in the 30's, primarily be36. See Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975); Manistee Bank &
Trust Co. v. McGowen, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975); Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial
District, 538 P.2d 574 (Nev. 1975); Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974);
Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771
(N.D. 1974); Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1973).
37. See Sidle v. Majors, 341 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 1976); Botsch v. Reisdorff, 193 Neb. 165,
226 N.W.2d 121 (1975); Behrns v. Burke, 229 N.W.2d 86 (S.D. 1975); White v. Hughes, 257
Ark. 627, 519 S.W.2d 70, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805 (1975); Beasley v. Bozeman, 294 Ala.
288, 315 So. 2d 570 (1975); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (Utah), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S.
810, rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 1060 (1974); Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. 1974);
Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1974); Duerst v. Limbocker, 525 P.2d 99 (Ore.
1974); Richardson v. Hansen, 527 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1974) (Colorado guest statute subsequently
repealed); Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
38. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
39. Id. at 485.
40. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
41. Id. at 76.
42. Comment, 18 CALIF. L. REV. at 184.
43. Id.
44. Tipton, supra note 1, at 287.
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cause of the increased use of automobile liability insurance."5 It was
felt that the incentive for drivers and passengers to engage in collusive lawsuits to defraud insurers would increase correspondingly
with the increased use of the automobile. Guest statutes were enacted as a means of meeting these evils.
When guest statutes were adopted, it was impossible to tell how
successful they would be in dealing with the evils enunciated. Since
courts have generally given legislatures wide latitude in formulating
classes for separate treatment, particularly when experimental legislation in social and economic matters was involved,4" the minimum rationality analysis of the classification presented by guest
statutes was justified. 7 Guest statutes, however, have operated for
forty-eight years to deny guests recovery for injuries suffered as a
result of a host driver's negligence. When a classification scheme has
existed for such a length of time, it is likely that all of the rationales
advanced in its support have been developed and the court should
fully examine such rationales to determine whether they provide
sound support for the statutory classification. As guest statutes
can no longer be termed experimental legislation, the Reed
approach to the equal protection test should be utilized to determine the validity of the guest statute; that is, to determine whether
the statutory classification bears a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation.
IV.

AN ANALYSIS OF Sidle v. Majors IN LIGHT OF THE Reed APPROACH
TO EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

In its opinion responding to the Seventh Circuit's certification,
the Indiana Supreme Court enunciated two purposes for the Indiana
guest statute: the protection of hospitality by insulating generous
drivers from lawsuits instituted by ungrateful guests, and the elimination of collusive lawsuits.' 9
The Seventh Circuit, applying the Reed approach to equal protection analysis,5° however, could find no rational relationship between the classification of the statute and the purposes for such
classification as proposed by the Indiana Supreme Court. To reach
45.
46.
341, 349
47.
48.

Weber, supra note 3, at 35.
See Tussman and ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALF. L. Rav.
(1949). See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. at 489.
See Tussman and ten Broek, supra note 46, at 348.
Manistee Bank and Trust Co. v. McGowen, 394 Mich. 655, 672, 232 N.W.2d 636,

643 (1975).
49. 341 N.E.2d at 768.
50. 536 F.2d at 1159.
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this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit relied heavily upon Brown v.
Merlo,5 ' which effectively eliminated protection of hospitality and
prevention of collusion as reasons for upholding a guest statute.
The California Supreme Court like the court in Sidle, chose to
utilize the Reed approach to the traditional equal protection test to
conclude that the California guest statute was unconstitutional.2
The Brown court found the interest in hospitality formerly protected by the guest statute was now protected by liability insurance.5 3 Therefore, even in the absence of a guest statute, the state's
interest in shielding the host from the financial burdens of a lawsuit
would remain protected.
The Brown court also found the prevention of collusion to be
lacking in any substantive merit as a reason for upholding the guest
statute. Since recovery is allowed for willful misconduct or when
compensation is paid, parties prone to collude could avoid the statute anyway.54 Given modern techniques for discovery and the availability of other means to detect collusion among parties to a lawsuit,
such as cross-exmination, collusion is hardly an acceptable purpose
for classifying people as those likely to collude and those unlikely
to do so. Prevention of collusion does not provide a substantially
rational basis for closing the door on the automobile guest.
V.

SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY SUPPORTING GUEST STATUTES FAILS
TO SURVIVE THE SUBSTANTIAL RATIONALITY TEST

Relying on the reasoning of Reed and Brown, then, the Sidle
court considered prior Supreme Court authority relating to a guest
statute, Silver v. Silver,55 to be clearly distinguishable.5" The Silver
court applied a Dandridge type57 approach to the equal protection
test; that is, the Court was willing to accept any conceivable set of
51. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
52. Id. at 861, 506 P.2d at 216, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
53. Id. at 67-68, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
In contrast to the late 1920's when guest statutes began to emerge and only 20 percent
of automobile drivers carried insurance, nearly 80 percent of today's drivers carry liability
insurance. Compare Elsbre and Roberts, Compulsory Insurance Against Motor Vehicle
Accidents, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 690, 691 (1928) with CAL. DEPT. OF MOTOR VEH. Div. OF DRIVERS
LICENSES, REPORT OF GENERAL ACITIES at 9 (Nov. 1972).

54. 8 Cal. 3d at 875, 506 P.2d at 226, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 402 (1973).
55. 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
56. 536 F.2d at 1158.
57. The two-tier equal protection model was a product of the Warren Court during the
1960's. Prior to the development of the two-tier analysis, the minimal scrutiny, extremely
deferential approach to equal protection analysis illustrated in Dandridge was traditionally
used by the Court to deal with alleged equal protection violations other than race. G.
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 658 (9th ed. 1975).
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facts to support the classification presented by the Connecticut
guest statute."8 Upholding the constitutionality of the guest statute,
the Silver Court relied primarily upon the fear that courts would be
inundated with troublesome lawsuits.59
At the time of the Silver decision, this factor did bear a rational
relationship to the classification. Automobile use was still in an
experimental stage and time was needed to assess the cost of inevitable injuries. The guest statute in that case was an initial attempt
by the Connecticut legislature to deal with the problem of vexatious
litigation produced by the increase in automobile use. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has defended classifications such as that presented
in Silver on the ground that the legislature may deal with a problem
in a piecemeal fashion. 0 The Court will apply a minimum rationality standard to a legislative classification which represents an attempt to deal with a problem one step at a time.' In 1929 the Silver
guest statute represented such an attempt.
However, as forty-eight years have passed since the Silver
decision, the guest statute can no longer be viewed as an experimental step to deal with the problem of vexatious litigation. On that
basis, then, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Reed approach
to equal protection analysis should be used to determine the validity
of the statutory classification. Because of the rationale espoused in
support of the classification,62 it is doubtful that a guest statute
similar to that which formerly existed in Connecticut63 could survive
a Reed-type equal protection analysis; that is, the classification is
no longer substantially related to the purpose of the legislation.
58. See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. at 123-24. The Silver Court considered only the
statutory distinction between automobile guests and guests in other kinds of conveyances.
59. Id. at 122-23.
60. See 280 U.S. at 123, and Tussman and ten Broek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 351 (1949).
61. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955).
62. Guest statutes, as originally adopted, were seen as a means of protecting the host
driver against a guest's ingratitude, which often took the form of a suit for injuries suffered
as a result of the host's negligent operation of an automobile. Today, because of the widespread use of automobile liability insurance, it is the insurance company and not the host
that wins protection under the guest statute. The insurance company usually represents the
insured at trial and any damages awarded will be paid from insurance company coffers. As
there is no notion of ingratitude in suing the host's insurer, the statute can no longer be viewed
as a necessary means to thwart the ungrateful guest. See Comment, Equal Protection Challenges to Automobile Guest Statutes, 8 CREIGHTON L. REv. 432, 448 (1974) and Brown v.
Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 868, 506 P.2d 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1973).
63. Connecticut repealed its guest statute in 1937. See ch. 82, § 540e [1937] CONN.
STAT. 277 (Supp. 1939).
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VI.

THE IRREBUT'ABLE PRESUMPTION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO EQUAL

PROTECTION ANALYSIS?

In addition to using a substantial rationality approach to distinguish Silver, the Seventh Circuit in Sidle suggested that the
statutory classification could be attacked as an irrebuttable presumption." An irrebuttable presumption may arise whenever a statute states or implies that one fact (the basic fact) is conclusive
evidence of another fact (the presumed fact) that provides the basic
rationale for the classification established by the provision..5 The
Silver result implies that the fact that one is a guest (the basic fact)
is presumed to be conclusive evidence that one will engage in vexatious litigation (the presumed fact). Denial of the opportunity to
demonstrate one's lack of such a motive constitutes a denial of due
process.66

Utilizing an irrebuttable presumption technique to analyze the
legislative classification requires the congruence between the classification and the legislative objective to be perfect, or that there be
a compelling state interest to support the classification." In effect,
the court in Sidle advocated a strict scrutiny analysis of the statutory classification." Generally, such a strict standard has been applied only when a fundamental interest or suspect classification is
involved," but the use of the irrebuttable presumption technique
allows such a standard to be used regardless of the type of interest
infringed or classification created. 0
Since a significant number of state statutes create permanent
classifications which are less than perfect," it is conceivable that all
could be challenged on the ground that they create an irrebuttable
presumption. And, applying strict scrutiny to such statutes would
undoubtedly result in the unconstitutionality of most of them.
Because an irrebuttable presumption essentially involves an
overbroad12 classification, the attack on the statute, as a technical
64. 536 F.2d at 1158, citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1972).
65. Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions:An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449, 451
(1975). See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 342, at 804 (2d ed. 1972).
66. Note, supra note 65, at 451.
67. Id. at 460.
68. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 451-52.
69. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 638, and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 11.
70. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 460-62 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 462.
72. An overbroad classification imposes a burden upon a wider range of individuals
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matter, should be based on equal protection grounds.7 3 This approach avoids the inadvertent application of the strict scrutiny test
and allows an actual examination of the relationship between the
statutory classification and its purposes in accordance with the
Reed approach to equal protection analysis.74
In spite of these compelling arguments to declare the Indiana
guest statute unconstitutional, the Seventh Circuit felt obligated to
affirm in light of the Supreme Court's action in Cannon v. Oviatt.7'
In that case, the Supreme Court of Utah rejected an equal protection challenge to a guest statute virtually identical to the statute
presented in Sidle.7 A subsequent appeal to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Because a dismissal for want of a substantial federal question
is an adjudication on the merits," the Seventh Circuit felt compelled to affirm the decision of the district court.7 8
Subsequently, the Supreme Court, relying on its decision in
Cannon, summarily denied Sidler's petition for a writ of certiorari. 7 9
Because Cannon was dismissed in the face of widespread controvery
as to the constitutionality of the guest statute; was dismissed without benefit of briefs or oral argument on the merits; and was announced without opinion or citation to any other precedent, Justices
Marshall and Brennan, dissenting, doubted Cannon's validity as
grounds for denying the petition for writ of certiorari. 0 Both justices
viewed the statute as patently open to serious constitutional debate
and considered the denial based on Cannon a hindrance to developing constitutional jurisprudence. 8'
than are included in the class at which the law aims. Tussman and ten Broek, supra note 46,
at 351.
73. Note, supra note 65, at 473.
74. Id.
75. 520 P.2d 883 (Utah), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 810, rehearing denied, 419 U.S.
1060 (1974).
76. 536 F.2d at 1159.
77. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 551 (3rd ed. 1976).
78. The significance of a dismissal for want of a substantial federal question has been
the subject of much critical comment. See Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at the
October Terms, 1937 and 1938, 53 HARv. L. REV. 579 (1940); Note, The InsubstantialFederal
Question, 62 HARV. L. REv. 488 (1949); Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice:A Critique,
69 HARV. L. REV. 707 (1956). While the dismissal for want of a substantial federal question is
technically a decision on the merits and frequently used as precedent, 69 HARv. L. REv. 707,
709, the use of such decisions as a source of substantive rules should be approached with
caution. It is always possible that the dismissal is a technical one, as for failure to properly
present the federal question. Id. at 711. Per curiams are at times ignored by lower courts and
by the Supreme Court itself. Id. at 712, 723.
79. 45 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976).
80. Id. at 3344.
81. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The purposes for the classification inherent in the Indiana guest
statute are unreasonable today. Though the purposes espoused by
the legislature may have had validity when the statute was originally adopted, such validity has vanished as a result of the proliferation of automobile liability insurance and the wider use of legal
techniques to detect perjury and collusion. Denial to guests of recompense for negligently inflicted injury, death, or loss cannot be
justified as a reasonable means to promote hospitality or prevent
collusion. The invalidity of the stated statutory purposes coupled
with the current Supreme Court approach to equal protection analysis should cause the Supreme Court to reconsider the validity of
state guest statutes should a guest statute once again be submitted
to that body.
James Harrington
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